FBU Response to the RBFA IRMP Action Plan 2012-13 Consultation

Introduction
The Fire Brigades Union (FBU) welcomes the opportunity to comment on the draft Royal Berkshire Fire Authority (RBFA) IRMP Action Plan for 2012/13. The FBU’s comments are intended to be constructive and based on the principles contained within its IRMP Framework document which has in the past; been distributed to RBFA Members and RBFRS Senior Management.   

The FBU firmly believes in and supports the process of IRMP as described in all of the current national guidance documents.

That said, the FBU fully recognises the current financial climate as imposed on RBFA by Central Government but does not support the approach taken thus far.

Last Year’s Action Plan
The Fire Minister Bob Neill indicated that efficiency savings could be achieved through a series of measures including the following which have not been, nor continue to be, adopted by RBFA:

• Shared services/back office functions
• Improved Procurement
• Sharing Chief Fire Officers and other senior staff
• Voluntary amalgamations

The result of the Authorities’ approach has been to implement hastily thought-out front line cuts and changes without them being thoroughly researched. This resulted in over £6M being ‘banked’ for capital projects at a time of austerity, pay freezes, pay cuts and actual and threatened redundancies.

The FBU fully recognises and supports the Prevention and Protection work which has assisted in the reduction of risk critical incidents however; it should also be recognised that incidents whether, preventable or not, will occur. To this end, it is the FBU’s professional opinion that the Authorities’ ‘rush for the cash’ in risk critical areas has exposed RBFA to an unprecedented risk in relation to Response activities that should, and could have been avoided.

Over the past twelve months we have witnessed a worsening service through:

• Increased attendance times
• Increased inability to deliver the required resources to the incident ground
• Increased risk to firefighter safety
• Increased risk to public safety.

The cuts already imposed and those being proposed are looked at in an insular and blinkered way and take no account of their consequential cost and impact on society and the wider economy.

If one fire could have been stopped from spreading or a casualty at an RTC extracted quicker and received earlier hospital medical intervention, all of these changes will cease to be cost effective.

What an IRMP should be
At its simplest level, Integrated Risk Management Planning (IRMP) is just taking a planned approach to delivering the business activities of Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service (RBFRS). A true IRMP is therefore a process that, if done properly, leads to a risk assessed, performance driven, cost effective improvement in RBFRS’s provision delivered by a safe, well trained and motivated workforce.

The FBU fully supports and endorses RBFA’s stated aim that “The aim of the Service’s Integrated Risk Management Plan is to deliver the Right Resources at the Right Time, in the Right Place.”

The IRMP Action Plan for 2012-13, like its more recent predecessor continues to be based first and foremost on finance and it is therefore disingenuous to call it a risk management plan when in reality, it is about the management of money – not the management of risk.The proposed action plan will deliver Some Resources at Some Time, in Any Place.The following comments relate to the particular sections of the IRMP 2012/13 Action Plan (Consultation Document).

General Observations
The Fire Brigades Union general observations on the 2012/13 IRMP Action Plan for Royal Berkshire Fire Authority are:

• Overall, there is no plan to improve attendance times to dwelling fires and road traffic collisions
• Still no plan to set commercial and heritage response standards including weight of attack
• Fire cover in Newbury, Maidenhead, Windsor and Slough will continue to worsen.
• Wholetime fire engines will be crewing with four firefighters more often and subsequently will be able to achieve less at dynamic emergency incidents.
• The resilience for command and control of larger and protracted incidents is not being addressed.
• The IRMP is not a properly integrated plan. 
• The approach to IRMP and to managing the budgetary pressures does not adequately reflect national guidance leaving the Authority exposed to criticism and is now having an impact on the wellbeing of the general public as well as the firefighters.
• The plan implies that further front line posts will be removed, this against the continued expansion of support staff

Recommendations

• There should be a place in the IRMP documents to detail how performance is progressing against the baseline figures. 
• The Authority should be reporting each year in the IRMP documents whether the changes being made in IRMP are improving performance.
• The Authority should ensure that there is consistency in reporting the statistics from year to year and where there are anomalies, these should be explained.
• The Fire Authority should engage directly with the union to resolve issues in relation to solutions and improvements to firefighter and public safety

Observations

Chairman’s Foreword
The Chairman states that this plan highlights the key actions that RBFRS will be taking to ensure we continue to provide a good service for the public in Berkshire. The FBU is concerned at the perception that we are providing a good service as front-line services are, to a degree, being eroded such as increased switch-crewing, delayed attendances to higher risk incidents and delayed attendances to fires at commercial premises. 

If the Chairman’s comments in the foreword are to mean something then they should reflect the reality of the difficulties being faced by the Authority.

Our Performance
As stated last year, a lot of work was done in previous years in setting baseline figures for IRMP against the response standards. The idea was that there would be a rolling baseline figure that advanced by one year each year. At its inception the RBFA clearly stated that changes would result in a year on year improvement in performance yet again disappointedly, RBFRS’s own data demonstrates a clear decline in performance.

The FBU continues of the view that there should be a place in the IRMP documents to detail how performance is progressing against the baseline figures.  The Authority should be reporting each year in the IRMP documents whether the changes being made in IRMP are improving performance.   

Prevention
The Fire Brigades Union notes that the statements made are a matter of fact and are not measured against previous year’s performance or against the Strategic aims.

Protection
Again the FBU reiterates its previous statement and wishes to express its concerns that following the introduction of the new Officers Rota there will not be 100% availability of Fire Safety officers to carry out statutory duties as issues arise. 

RBFRS suggests that it reduced AFA’s by 20% when it fact it has taken the decision not to attend and there were occasions where a reduced attendance was sent which on arrival turned out to be a more serious incident.

It is also suggested that the department assisted in reducing fires in commercial properties by 3.6% – where is the evidence?

Emergency Response
The FBU cautiously welcomes the continued reduction in the overall numbers of incidents attended by RBFRS. The reason for this caution is based on the fact that RBFRS management make the decision not to attend when requested to do so by the very people we exist to serve – members of the community in distress. It could be argued that incidents are predominantly there, we choose not to respond.  The FBU’s opinion is therefore that the reduction is partly as result of previous years IRMP’s outcomes and preventative campaigns however, this reduction is primarily due to the non attendance which has been to the detriment of the members of the community who we exist to serve.

Initiatives introduced without public consultation and outside the scope of IRMP include the non attendance to Road Traffic Collisions where persons are not trapped, flooding incidents, persons shut in lifts to name but a few.

If we are an emergency service and members of the community we serve ask for our assistance do we not have a moral duty to assist them?

Response to Road Traffic Collisions
The 2002/3 is the Baseline against which the Authority measures its performance. Following the introduction of the IRMP process and despite assurances that it would demonstrate year on year improvement, it can clearly be seen that the opposite has been delivered.

The 84.4% shown in 2010/11 is a clear demonstration of ‘if it doesn’t fit – make it fit’. The criteria has been changed so that it only captures attendance at 11 minutes when persons are actually trapped – not against the 11 minute attendance. This practice was introduced last year following a ‘successful trial’ but this was at the expense of the depletion of fire cover in risk critical areas.

Response to Dwelling Fires
Again, the FBU reiterates its previous statement. Despite continuous upheaval, performance in this risk critical area continues to fall against both measuring criteria’s.

RBFRS states that “All failures to achieve the attendance times are thoroughly investigated by managers to identify the rationale and to establish where and how improvements can be made”. This is a misleading statement as RBFRS no longer measures against the 8 and 10 minute standards as evidenced in the Intranet Station pages.

This is of grave concern to the FBU as clearly the longer we take to get there, the higher the risk of injury and death to firefighters and members of community. It goes without saying that it also results in preventable losses.

The statement contained within the document that “The reason for this is the number of calls to dwelling fires has reduced over time, with some now occurring in more remote locations from fire stations, which has an affect on our attendance times” is not quantified and the plan no longer shows the baseline graph which indicated the levels of activity in this area year on year. In the absence of evidence, the FBU strongly challenges the accuracy of this statement.

Nothing in the action plan attempts to address this continuous failure and members of the community continue to be exposed to a higher than necessary risk of injury and death. The FBU would challenge the Chairman’s assertion that RBFRS is providing a good, efficient and effective service.

The FBU agrees that the availability of Retained appliances needs to be improved throughout the County and that Retained firefighters should be fully supported by RBFA’ The introduction of the Retained Support Unit is long overdue however; by RBFRS’s own admission risk critical incidents in areas covered by Retained appliances are very low, the FBU would challenge how that statement is quantified.

The rationale and evidence against which the Baselines were set, is clearly demonstrated in the following graphs.   

The following image clearly demonstrates that the rate at which the size of any fire increases itself increases with time. For example, between minutes 3 and 4, the fast-growing fire increases in size by about 12 units, but between minutes 9 and 10 it increases in size by over 40 units. If a person has survived near to a fire for nine minutes, one minute later the fire could have increased in size by such an extent that they will be killed.

Likewise, the longer we take to get there the more resources will be required to deal with the incident as demonstrated by the following graph.

To date no standards have been set against commercial properties

What We Have Done in 2010/11Attendance at Road Traffic Collisions
The FBU welcomes the investment made in the new Heavy Rescue Unit which has undoubtedly improved our capability to deal with current and a wider variety of incidents. Having made such an investment, the Authority then ignored the professional concerns raised by its employees and the FBU as their representatives. We maintain that the HRU/RSV should attend all incidents thus ensuring that the appropriate resources are available if required and this will also assist in the maintenance of fire cover.

The FBU refutes the text contained in the IRMP action plan as being incorrect and misleading. FBU representatives fully participated in the review project and have always maintained that there should be two fully crewed units in the County.

The FBU representatives never agreed that the HRU Unit should be based at Dee Road Fire Station nor did they agree that the unit should loose its dedicated crewing.RBFRS management continuously challenge the mobilisation of the units and this has resulted in them not being mobilised when they were required. The removal of the HRU crewing now results in Newbury loosing its fire cover when the unit is requested.

More concerning is the fact that there will come a time when the HRU unit is required but it will not be mobilised until an appliance is in attendance resulting in an unacceptable delay, if we can find a crew to take it, and potentially will lead to more serious injuries than would have otherwise occurred and potential death through delay in extrication.

Additionally, by not mobilising the RSV at Slough the East of the County is regularly stripped of adequate fire cover which is recognised as the highest risk area within the County.

Using CLG’s Fire Service Emergency Cover (FSEC) formula would indicate that a 10% increase in RTC response times translates into a 7% increase in predicted fatalities at RTCs. It stated that an average response of eight minutes has a predicted fatality rate of 0.097 per life risk incident, versus 0.104 for an 8.8 minute response time. Previous work has estimated that there are about 1,000 fatal RTCs attended by UK FRSs. Therefore, a 7% increase would equate to about an extra 70 deaths in the UK per year, or about 65 for England.

The Authority failed to assess the financial benefits against the societal risks and the outcome of the implementation thus far is having an adverse effect in relation to the dwelling fire and RTC response standards.

Low Risk Call Attendance
A cost saving measure which; resulted in the resignation of Retained (RDS) firefighters from an already stretched service. This has led to a drop in confidence and morale of the RDS personnel and an increased exposure to a higher risk of accidents and injuries. A result of the introduction of this policy is that response standards for dwelling fires and road traffic collisions have been affected as high risk areas are left exposed.

Review Of Emergency Cover
Whilst welcoming the proposed move of Dee Road Fire Station to the Calcot area which will undoubtedly improve response times, the FBU is somewhat disappointed that this decision has come about due to the need to relocate the headquarters building and not based on the overwhelming evidence identified in 2007 and supported by the FBU at the time.

We do not support the decision of not going ahead with the proposed Twyford Fire Station as Wargrave Fire Station’s fabric is outdated and not fit for a 21^st Century service. The Twyford option would result is a building fit for the 21^st Century and ensures the long term presence of such a vital resource in the local community.

The figures quoted in the document are misleading and wide of the mark as they are taken from the work carried out in providing a full time station at Wokingham with accommodation for personnel providing 24 hour cover.

The proposed Twyford Fire Station would be of a much smaller scale therefore requiring a smaller plot of land and significantly lower building costs.

Training Review
This review has now been completed and the FBU urges the Authority to carefully consider its recommendations and look at ways of implementing them thus leading to a more competent, well trained workforce.

Officers Review 
In its response to the 2010/11 IRMP plan, the FBU encouraged the RBFA to engage directly with the union to resolve issues in relation to the Officers’ Cover Review. This request never came to fruition.

Interim arrangements have been implemented resulting in the loss of 5 Officers. This 10% reduction is now impacting on the ability of RBFRS to maintain a safe level of Officer cover and is impacting on workloads. In April a further 10% reduction is being introduced and the FBU has serious concerns that safety, operational resilience, managerial capacity and individuals’ health will be maintained and supported.

The FBU has always argued that the reduction now being implemented did not have any resilience and the number of Officers did not match the levels required to meet the workload demands. Following the internal re-structure consultation, RBFRS now proposes to employ a further (in addition to the two already employed) four non-uniformed project managers.

Given that the cuts were driven by the austerity measures resulting in significant savings, how are those savings being realised when you employ six new members of staff? The resilience issue continues to not being addressed.

Retained Review
The concerns raised at the last consultation in relation to the loss of the training reserve have become true even before the introduction of the Retained Support Units. We now see appliances crewing with four riders on a daily basis as opposed to the Authority’s policy aim of crewing with five. The document states that “The Retained Support Officers have been provided from existing resources, without affecting emergency cover to the community.” Although true, the removal of these existing resources are affecting our ability to deal with incidents in a safe and effective manner.

Attendance At Automatic Fire Alarm Incidents
Following the challenge to last years IRMP report, it was recommended to and agree by the Authority to introduce a one appliance attendance to domestic alarms between the hours of 09:00 and 18:00. Is the Authority aware that this was subsequently changed to between 0800 and 2100 hours? 

The plan only indicates a reduction of calls attended but does not state how many of those alarms were in fact fires, of which there have been a few, leading to an unnecessary risk to the health and safety of responding firefighters and increased losses to the owners/occupiers.

Action Plan 2012/13 – What We Are Going To Do This YearReview Of Specialist Appliances
If it is proposed to carry out the reviews during 2012/13 why is it that some have already started and must be completed by April 2012 when the document is still under consultation? Yet again the FBU is seeing a ‘rush for the cash’ and a consultation process being undertaken when the decisions have already been made. This demonstrates contempt for the professional opinion of firefighters and the valuable engagement with the community we serve.

The FBU proposes that these appliances are required and form an integral part of our response effectiveness and as such we urge the Authority to include within this review crewing methods. Today, our ability to deliver these units to the incident ground is being seriously challenged as we do not have the personnel to deliver them to critical incidents without undue pressure on our ability to deal with the incident and provide fire cover.

Aerial Ladder Platform (high reach appliance) at Slough
It is widely known that RBFRS management wish to remove this appliance from its fleet. It has been previously stated that this appliance is not often used, and when it is used, its not very often for rescues, so therefore it doesn’t matter if there is a delay getting it there as most of the time it is only used for firefighter safety or putting water onto a big fire.

However, aerial appliances are a critical tool in maintaining firefighter safety, affect rescues on a regular basis and are regularly used at medium and large incidents in Berkshire.

The removal of this appliance will lead to a lack of resilience and since the only aerial appliance will be based at Whitley Wood fire station, it will have an impact on RBFRS’s ability to crew the OSU and HERU. Additionally should it be needed to carry out rescues, any delay in is arrival could seriously affect the outcome of a potentially successful rescue.

Replacement For Dee Road Fire Station
In addition to the comments already made under the “Review of Emergency Cover” the FBU urges the Authority to consider locating the fire station within the new headquarters complex. This would lead to a considerable capital expenditure saving and ongoing capital and revenue savings for the life of the building.

In line with the areas identified in the risk map, this location would deliver the desirable increased performance in response times.

Windsor Fire Station
The FBU continues to have grave doubts about the proposal to respond to incidents in the Windsor area with the L4P van crewed by 3 fire-fighters. The Fire Authority has been unable to demonstrate that this will provide a safe and effective service to the residents of Windsor. It is important to note that no other UK fire and rescue service has adopted a similar provision in respect of primary fires. This fact alone should encourage the Authority to be cautious.

The L4P was brought into service on a risk-assessed basis to provide fire cover to the CockMarsh area of Maidenhead, which has proved difficult to access in the past. It does not hold that this minimal level of service provision can then be transferred to a major town without any detriment to the residents it is there to protect – Windsor’s built environment presents no problems with access that would justify the use of this vehicle; rather Windsor lends itself to the need for a standard-sized fire appliance that can respond to all the incidents that an urban area generates.

The introduction of a non standard unit to a high risk area will also deprive that area of fire cover at times when the unit is not available due to mechanical defects/servicing. The reserve fleet is one of standard full size fire appliances.

The proposed introduction of co-responding in Windsor will be vigorously opposed by the FBU as it is non-contractual and outside our Role Maps as supported by the outcomes of the High Courts. 

The FBU is also concerned to hear that the existing Windsor Fire Station will close and cannot see how this benefits the residents of the town. Will the site of the new ‘fire station’ be risk-assessed to provide the best performance in respect of the response standards?

Road Traffic Collisions
The FBU is unclear on what this is trying to achieve. Team members are already disseminating their expertise and experiences to all firefighters and Officers who form part of the team already attend more difficult entrapments at the request of the Incident Commanders.

Wildfire/Forest Fires
It is regrettable that the Fire Authority has still not published the findings of its review into the Swinley Forest incident although many months have elapsed since the fire occurred. This report would provide a powerful learning opportunity for all the Authority’s partners and the wider fire and rescue service.

The FBU urges the Fire Authority to work with it and the South East of England Wildfire Group to refine its wildfire response policy so that this varies according to the risk posed by factors including the location of the fire (accessibility, vegetation, slope, exposure to solar radiation etc) and weather conditions (temperature, humidity, wind strength and direction etc).

© Fire Brigades Union – December 2011

Download document in PDF format

FBU Response to RBFA IRMP Action Plan 2011-12 Consultation

Introduction

The Fire Brigades Union thanks Royal Berkshire Fire Authority for the opportunity to comment on the draft IRMP Action Plan for 2011-12.  The Fire Brigades Union comments are intended to be constructive. 

The financial situation for Royal Berkshire Fire Authority at the close of the IRMP consultation period is healthier than at the commencement.  The union believes that the Authority should now instruct the Chief Fire Officer to utilize the period of increased financial certainty to research the proposals more thoroughly and not implement front-line related changes too hastily.  The rush to save in risk critical areas exposes Royal Berkshire Fire Authority to risk that could be avoided.

The following comments relate to the particular sections of the IRMP Action Plan (Consultation Document).

Executive Summary

The Fire Brigades Union general observations on the 2011-12 IRMP Action Plan for Royal Berkshire Fire Authority are:

• Overall, fire engine attendance times to dwelling fires and road traffic collisions in Newbury, Reading, Bracknell, Maidenhead, Windsor and Slough will worsen.
• Fire engines will be delayed attending real fires in commercial premises.
• Wholetime fire engines will be crewing with four firefighters more often and subsequently will be able to achieve less at dynamic emergency incidents.
• The resilience for command and control of larger and protracted incidents will not be improved.
• The IRMP is not a properly integrated plan.  Although there are plans to reduce and diminish service there is no justification as to why cuts in some areas are more acceptable than growth in other areas of the Authority’s budgetary plans. 
• The approach to IRMP and to managing the budgetary pressures does not adequately reflect national guidance leaving the Authority exposed to criticism and may also be at the expense of the wellbeing of the general public as well as the firefighters.
• The plan has not adapted to the changing financing situation.  It doesn’t seem right to the union that the removal of front-line resources are being planned whilst at the same time the Authority is planning to bank nearly one million pounds over two years to fund new buildings.  It also doesn’t seem right that new non front-line posts are being introduced in the budgetary process whilst existing front-line posts are being removed in the IRMP process.

Recommendations

1. If the Chairman’s comments in the foreword are to mean something then some of the proposed actions must be amended to ensure the front-line service is maintained.
2. There should be a place in the IRMP documents to detail how performance is progressing against the baseline figures. 
3. The Authority should be reporting each year in the IRMP documents whether the changes being made in IRMP are improving performance.
4. The Authority should ensure that there is consistency in reporting the statistics from year to year and where there are anomalies, these should be explained.
5. The report that the environmental protection and firefighter decontamination procedures are improved should be justified or removed.
6. The detailed review being undertaken to improve attendance times to dwelling fires should be an integral element of the IRMP Action Plan for 2011-12.
7. If the Authority proposes to send wholetime appliances to lower risk calls on retained station grounds then this should be on the basis that it doesn’t adversely affect the response standards for dwelling fires and road traffic collisions.
8. If the Authority proposes the benefits of reduced emergency response vehicle travel in one project but a consequence of another proposal is that it will increase, then criteria should be set so risk versus benefit can be assessed.
9. A reduction in the number of officers available for emergency response and urgent managerial duties should not happen without detailed evidence and research.
10. The Authority should not be proposing an IRMP project in relation to the number of officers on the false premise that it is required due to fewer incidents.
11. If a model for officer cover does exist but doesn’t increase resilience from 9 to 11 whilst at the same time reducing numbers employed from 45 to 33, then the plans should be reconsidered.
12. The Fire Authority should engage directly with the union to resolve issues in relation to the Officers’ Cover Review.
13. If the Fire Authority intends for crewing on wholetime appliances to be reduced to four firefighters on more occasions, it should set criteria so a risk versus benefit assessment can be made.
14. Royal Berkshire Fire Authority should adopt the nationally agreed CFOA protocol in relation to Automatic Fire Alarms and Unwanted Fire Signals.
15. The Authority should not embark on a project that from the outset it is known will lead to inherent delays in emergency response to fires in commercial premises.
16. Before progressing with the plans in relation to switch-crewing the Heavy Rescue vehicle the Authority should assess the financial benefits against the societal risks given there will be an adverse effect in relation to the dwelling fire and RTC response standards.
17. Given the proposed savings are identified for 2013-14, rather than fixing the proposed Heavy Rescue Unit crewing arrangements in 2011, the Authority should monitor and revisit the Heavy Rescue Unit proposals once the 2013-14 finance settlement is known.

Observations

Chairman’s Foreword.

The Chairman states that the Authority is determined ‘to maintain our front-line service’.  Yet in certain places in the Action Plan those front-line services are, to a degree, being eroded such as increased switch-crewing, delayed attendances to higher risk incidents and delayed attendances to fires at commercial premises.  If the Chairman’s comments in the foreword are to mean something then some of the proposed actions must be amended to ensure the front-line service is maintained.

Our Performance.

A lot of work was done in previous years in setting baseline figures for IRMP against the response standards.  The idea was that there would be a rolling baseline figure that advanced by one year each year.  The FBU is adamant that there should be a place in the IRMP documents to detail how performance is progressing against the baseline figures.  The Authority should be reporting each year in the IRMP documents whether the changes being made in IRMP are improving performance.   

Emergency Response. Page 8, Para 4.

Where is the evidence that the new system for the provision of environmental protection and firefighter decontamination is improved?  The deployment time is longer under the new system.  The report that the environmental protection and firefighter decontamination procedures are improved should be justified or removed.

Response to Road Traffic Collisions.

The figures on the graph on page 8 are at variance with the figures on the corresponding graph of the previous years IRMP.  Yet they are intending to show the same figures.  There is an error somewhere.  The Authority should ensure that there is consistency in reporting the statistics from year to year and where there are anomalies, these should be explained.

Response to Dwelling Fires. Page 9, bottom.

The plan identifies that there is a detailed review underway to improve performance in relation to the attendance times at dwelling fires.  The Fire Brigades Union is unaware of this review.  The detailed review being undertaken to improve attendance times to dwelling fires should be an integral element of the IRMP Action Plan for 2011-12.

What we are going to do this year

Wholetime appliances attending lower risk calls on retained station grounds.

The Fire Brigades Union has strong reservations about the Authority progressing with this project.  The areas of concern being:

• The only improvement here seems to be saving money.  The union is not averse to finding efficiencies, especially when those efficiencies are recycled into increased firefighter and public safety.  However, the people of Berkshire are likely to be more at risk given the negative effects on the response standards to the higher risk incidents.  Has the Authority fully considered that if a wholetime appliance is attending a low risk incident on a retained station ground then it is not available for a higher risk incident on its own station ground where the likelihood of an incident is greater? 
• There are mixed messages in relation to the overall IRMP proposals.  Some 2011-12 IRMP projects identify a benefit of change being reduced vehicle movements and the consequent reduced road safety and environmental risks.  It seems this project will deliver the opposite.
• Discrepancies between the potential savings identified in the IRMP Action Plan and the potential savings identified in the latest budget figures. 
• Although it is clear to the union that there will be some savings, and if nothing is done and Retained appliances become more available as a result of Retained Support Officers, the costs will go up; the union still believes in the principle that the service should plan against the higher risks namely dwelling fires and road traffic collisions.  If this policy is introduced attendance times to those higher risk incidents will be adversely affected to some extent.

If the Authority proposes to send wholetime appliances to lower risk calls on retained station grounds then this should be on the basis that it doesn’t adversely affect the response standards for dwelling fires and road traffic collisions.

If the Authority proposes the benefits of reduced emergency response vehicle travel in one project but a consequence of another proposal is that it will increase, then criteria should be set so risk versus benefit can be assessed.

Officers’ Cover Review. Page 18

The first paragraph clearly identifies a rationale for needing to review the number of officers as being linked to the reduction in the number of incidents being attended by Berkshire firefighters.  Given the evidence indicates that the number of larger 4+ appliance incidents in remaining steady, if not rising, over the previous eight years; the reduction in incidents in general is clearly not a reason to review the number and deployment of officers.  If it is about financing, as Principal Officers have told the union verbally, then just write that in the document as the primary driver for this project.  The Authority should not be proposing an IRMP project in relation to the number of officers on the false premise that it is required due to fewer incidents.

The Fire Brigades Union does not understand how reducing the number of officers will enhance resilience as the end of paragraph 1 states. 

The wording of the third paragraph should be amended.  It states:

Should budgetary pressures require it a model exists that would phase a reduction in officer numbers from 45 to 33, producing predicted savings of £350,000 in year one to £697,000 per annum in year three. In this model the minimum number of officers on duty at any one time will increase from 9 to 11 with the shift pattern altering from a five week to a three week frequency.

That statement clearly says there is a model in existence that will do three things, namely:

• Reduce officer numbers from 45 to 33,
• Make savings rising to £697K.
• Increase the minimum number of officers available at any one time from 9 to 11.

Does a model exist that can do these three things?  If a model for officer cover does exist but doesn’t increase resilience from 9 to 11 whilst at the same time reducing numbers employed from 45 to 33, then the plans should be reconsidered as that is what the Principal Officers told the Fire Authority could be delivered. 

The union and its members have been told various things about this model. Different senior managers have told different officers’ representatives different things about the existence of this model.

The union has now been informed informally on 27 Jan 2011 that the service will reduce to forty officers working a five week rota as an interim measure on 1 Apr 2011.  This will reduce minimum numbers from nine to eight and has been derived completely outside of IRMP and the Officers’ Cover Review.  A reduction in the number of officers available for emergency response and urgent managerial duties should not happen without detailed evidence and research.

The union is willing to work with the service to derive a new officers’ rota.  However, the union is experiencing an enormous loss of confidence in relationships with senior managers in recent months over this issue.  In short one thing is being said in meetings and something else and detrimental is happening subsequently. 

As a result, the union recommends that the Fire Authority should engage directly with the union to resolve issues in relation to the Officers’ Cover Review.

Closure of Cookham. Page 18

The plan says the appliances in Maidenhead would cover the Cookham area to the same level previously provided by the Cookham crew.  Where is the evidence for this?  As it identifies in the report on above (at the bottom of page 10) the cover would be to the same standard in the majority of areas but not in all areas.

Protection Review

The Protection review hadn’t been through challenge and subsequent consultation prior to the drafting of the 2011-12 IRMP Action Plan.   The union is concerned that with a three week rota, there will not be 100% availability of Fire Safety officers with the proposed Protection department structure. 

The Fire Brigades Union welcomes increased integration of protection into the everyday activities of firefighters.

Prevention Review

The Fire Brigades Union notes the restructure of the Prevention department.  The union queries the levels of the two station managers in the structure.  If their role is similar to the work undertaken by the two current group managers, the union queries whether it can be achieved appropriately within the station manager role map.  The Fire Brigades Union will work with the service to determine that.

The union believes that there is still more work to be done by the service to integrate better the prevention work done by operational staff on fire stations with the work done and being planned at service headquarters. 

Formation of a Retained Support Unit

There is concern that forming the Retained Support Unit from the training reserve will almost certainly increase the number of occasions that wholetime appliances crew with four riders as opposed to the Authority’s policy aim of crewing with five.  If the Fire Authority intends for crewing on wholetime appliances to be reduced to four firefighters on more occasions, it should set criteria so a risk versus benefit assessment can be made.

Attendance at Automatic Fire Alarm Incidents

The current proposals in the Action Plan will result in Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service not attending fires detected by fire alarms in commercial premises when first alerted.  If the CFOA protocol were to be followed this would not occur.

The Fire Brigades Union believes this will affect the health and safety of responding firefighters should there be a dynamic emergency incident when the crew arrives.   The Authority should not embark on a project that from the outset it is known will lead to inherent delays in emergency response to fires in commercial premises.

As the lead practitioner nationally in relation to this, Berkshire’s Chief Fire Officer has signed the CFOA protocol on the Fire and Rescue Service attendance to Automatic Fire Alarms and Unwanted Fire Signals, derived in partnership with the industry.  In that document he writes the following: “we strongly recommend that all FRSs adopt and implement this protocol in its entirety as a part of their Integrated Risk Management Plans.”  However, the proposals in this IRMP are at variance with this nationally derived protocol.  The union believes that for Berkshire not to adopt the protocol in its entirety would be an embarrassment.  More importantly, the protocol introduces greater risk control that what is currently being proposed in the IRMP Action Plan.  Royal Berkshire Fire Authority should adopt the nationally agreed CFOA protocol in relation to Automatic Fire Alarms and Unwanted Fire Signals.

Switch-Crewing the Heavy Rescue Unit

The proposals do not indicate the reduction in service should this happen but does identify the financial savings.  This is an IRMP document and if the authors have taken the time and effort to consider the savings they should balance this by showing the estimated sacrifice.  Moreover, the Fire Authority members should have been informed of this in the drafting stages.  Before progressing with the plans in relation to switch-crewing the Heavy Rescue vehicle the Authority should assess the financial benefits against the societal risks given there will be an adverse effect in relation to the dwelling fire and RTC response standards.

The Authority is aware that the Fire Brigades Union is opposed to switch-crewing front line fire engines with specialist appliances.  If one is out and about but the other is needed for an emergency, there is a delay.  Any delay in the response of an emergency appliance is unacceptable as people can die as a result, among them our own firefighters.  There will be no comfort in ‘I told you so’ should there be a death that could have been prevented.

The union is not aware of any evidence showing that the trial that commenced in May 2010 identified switch-crewing the fire engine with the Heavy Rescue Unit is viable.  As far as the union is aware it indicated that removal the Rescue Support Vehicles (and by inference the Heavy Rescue Vehicle) from smaller rescue incidents did not carry too much risk to the Authority; although the union does not concur with that conclusion.   The trial involving the existing vehicle was conducted with the existing vehicle being permanently crewed.  This proposal is for the crewing to be switched with a fire engine.  So what evidence does Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service have from the trial that the proposal is viable?  Also was there an effect on the performance against the dwelling fire response standards during this trial? 

Newbury is a location where there are already greater difficulties attaining the Authority’s response standards. The statistics show this.  Between 1 Sep. and 16 Dec. 2010 optimum dwelling fire response standards were met on sixteen percent of occasions in the Newbury area.  It will get worse again should there be a frequency increase in switch-crewing fire engines with special appliances.  The opposite is a risk too; should the fire engine be out and about there will be inherent delay in getting specialist equipment to many technical rescue incidents.  The union is aware that managers are already talking about moving the Heavy Rescue Unit to Reading and switch-crewing it there with a fire engine as opposed to Newbury.  Is this is what is meant by the word ‘currently’ in the section heading?  If so the Authority should be unambiguous about its intentions in the IRMP document.

The union notes that the proposed savings for this project are in 2013 -14 and believes that given the proposed savings are identified for 2013-14, rather than fixing the proposed Heavy Rescue Unit crewing arrangements in 2011, the Authority should monitor and revisit the Heavy Rescue Unit proposals once the 2013-14 finance settlement is known.  Should retained availability in the West of the county improve as a result of the IRMP then the risk in relation to this proposed project reduces.  The Fire Brigades Union reiterates, however, that it does not support switch-crewing as a model for providing emergency response.

Fire Brigades Union – Berkshire (31 January 2011)

Download the submission in PDF format

ENDS

Response to First RBFRS Three Week Rota Proposals and Current Situation Regarding the IRMP Officer Cover Review

10 January 2011

After sharing the proposed rota with the officer FBU members, 145 observations were made objecting to the proposals. Drawing these observations together and considering the issues involved, the FBU makes the following comments regarding the proposals as they currently are.

General

1. The union believes that the Fire Authority has been misadvised into the understanding that approx. £700,000 of savings could be made and at the same time increase minimum officer resilience from nine to eleven.  The union has requested to be provided with the ‘model’ identified in the IRMP project plan, to be advised that it does not exist.  The union believes that the Chief Fire Officer now has an absolute duty to inform the Fire Authority of this.
2. The union queries the immediate necessity of reducing the number of officers.  The original parameter being ‘should budgetary pressure require it’.  The obvious question being: does it still require this?  The union believes that given the indicative local government finance settlement for 2011 and 2012, the Fire Authority has been afforded the time to look at this project more closely and broaden the parameters.
3. The union does not believe that this project has properly defined success criteria for anything other than the amount of money that can be saved.  As an IRMP project, success should be defined in terms of what can be achieved for the investments being made.
4. The union understood the imperatives at the time this review was being planned and now believes the correct thing to do is to react and realign this project to the amended financial environment.  Given what the union considers to be a vastly improved financial environment for 2011 and 2012 than that feared in October 2010 the constraints and parameters of this review should be broadened to include what has been referred to as ‘the day job’.  Effectively the service has been provided an opportunity to do this by the Government and should take that opportunity.
5. The union does not believe it is mathematically possible to reduce from forty-five to thirty three officers and have a minimum of eleven at any one time. 
6. The union queries the potential to realise the full savings indicated to the Fire Authority, especially if there is to be an increased number of non-operational managers. 
7. The union believes there are better ways of redesigning the officers’ rota than the one currently proposed.
8. The union wants to get involved with better proposals but have been informed by the project manager that this can not be achieved through the project itself given the constraints of the project.  For example, although the union was assured at the commencement of the project that a four-week rota would be drafted as an option, this is no longer possible within the constraints of the project (according to the project manager).
9. Given the budgetary information the Chief Fire Officer shared with the union prior to 20 Oct 2010, the union believes there are other options available to the Fire Authority for 2011 and 2012 that will have less impact than reducing the number of officers.

10.The IRMP report identifies a reduced number of operational incidents as a driver for change in relation to Officer numbers.  This is an entirely false assertion.  The number of incidents attended by officers is remaining steady with modest variations up and down for the previous eight years. 

11.The union is not sure of what the planning assumptions are.  I.e. what scenarios will the planned number of officers designed to address?  The union suggests the following: based on actual historic incidents, RBFRS should plan for the minimum number of officers in order to cater for the reasonable expectations of the following:

1. One six pump incident with reliefs without recourse to recall or Thames Valley resilience.
2. Two concurrent six pump incidents with recourse to recall and Thames Valley resilience for reliefs.
3. One ten or twelve pump incident with recourse to recall and Thames Valley resilience for reliefs.

12.The union has still not seen the calculations that derive the proposed ridership factor of 1.3.

Workloads

13.The union believes that the Chief Fire Officer has a clear responsibility to report to the Fire Authority how he believes the proposals would affect workloads.  The union would be surprised if the Chief Fire Officer did not believe the impact would be adverse.

14.The union calculates that more than 27,000 hours of officer managerial time will be lost each year as a result of these proposals.  The union believes that it is completely inappropriate to propose such changes without looking at the full effect of the proposals i.e. the day job.  However, this is outside the terms of reference for the project manager. 

15.The union is concerned that workloads for remaining officers will increase.  RBFRS has, in the view of the FBU officers, been historically poor at controlling the increase in workloads for officers and does not see credible plans to address this as part of the proposals on the reduction of the officer numbers.

16.Officers are already working to capacity or in many cases beyond.  With a reduced number of officers there is real concern that the workloads will increase further and adversely affect wellbeing. 

17.If there is to be a reduction in the number of officers to the levels proposed, the union believes the service should research this in more depth before proceeding.  Given the more positive financial position and given the risks to officer wellbeing, the union advises that the service has the time to proceed more cautiously than the current plans identify. 

18.The union believes that with the proposed number of officers that will be lost, the service will suffer the results of increased ‘reactive management’ at the expense of ‘proactive management’.  The union assumes that if the service had the choice it would choose a proactive management culture.  The union believes that given the indicative finance settlements for 2011 and 2012 the service does currently have that choice.

19.The union has concerns that with thirty-three officers undertaking the work currently done by forty-seven (i.e. the current ­de facto number), there will be an increasing likelihood of fatigue affecting decision making

Individual Needs & Family Friendly

The agreed Conditions of Service are clear in relation to the officers’ rota in this area: ‘It should have regard to the special circumstances of individual employees and be family friendly.’ 

20.The union does not believe these conditions have been appropriately considered to date and indeed given the parameters of the project can not be appropriately addressed.

21.The leave arrangements for the proposed rota are rigid and will not facilitate sufficient time for leave when officers with families would like to take that leave.  For example school summer holidays.  With a little effort the current rota affords each officer with family needs the ability to take two weeks leave during the school summer holiday.  The proposed rota does not afford that.  The union believes that if the constraints of the project were relaxed, then a rota could be developed that is acceptable to the officers in terms of leave in school Summer holidays.

22.The union insists that officers’ with school age children are able to take their main leave periods during times the schools are on holiday.  This will facilitate caring arrangements if the other parent is working and will also facilitate taking holidays.

23.One group of officers likely to be hit the most with the proposed rota comprises those who live outside the county or provide cover in an area other than where they live.  In the proposed three week cycle there are two long periods where these officers would be away from their families.  One of these periods is for approx. 82 hours and the other approx. 74 hours. Comparing this to the existing rota introduces a clear increase in the proportion of the rota cycle away from home for more than a consecutive forty-eight hours.  The union refer to this as a Continuous Absence Factor.  For the current rota this factor is 0.23.  For the proposed rota it is more than a third higher at 0.31.  The union officials can demonstrate to the project manager how these figures have been derived.  Whilst the current rota arrangements are acceptable to these officers and the FBU, the proposed rota is not.

24.It is entirely foreseeable that due to the inflexibility of the leave selection as well as the increased frequency of seventy plus hours per week continuous duty in the proposed rota, that there will be increased strain on families and relationships as a result of its introduction.

25.The ability to take leave at weekends in the proposed rota is not a compensating factor to the officers.  The union can work with the service to create a leave system that is likely to be acceptable to its members in terms of being family friendly but the current proposals are not agreeable to the union.

26.Some officers have partners who work at weekends.  Given that the current rota has four out of five weekends free from duty, this is the best period for some of these partners to make themselves available for work.  Additionally the current rota has more rota leave days than the proposed rota which again are days that can be utilised by the partners of officers to make themselves available for work.  Decreasing these frequencies will adversely affect the work-life balance for these families and is likely to directly affect their household income in a high cost part of the country. 

27.The proposed rota with longer periods away from home will seemingly increase costs for families.

28.The proposals seem likely to be less attractive for single parent families than the existing rota given the increase in long continuous periods of duty and the increased frequency of weekends.

The Rota (other than family and individual needs)

29.The proposed rota does not account for absences other than planned leave such as training courses, compensatory time off, sickness absences, pre and post-course leave, ADCs, PDIs, disciplines, court attendances.

30.The union believes that the review should consider the benefits of planning a rota with positive hours that straddle the busiest periods of operational activity for the officers and amend as appropriate. 

31.Officers currently undertake work outside their rostered days to help make things work.  The quid pro quo being that they are afforded compensatory time off generally at a time of convenience to the officer.  The proposed rota is extremely tight and doesn’t currently incorporate this demand.  The union’s concerns being that if the quid pro quo is not there then the officer will not do this work over and above rostered hours.

32.The proposed rota will be extremely difficult to manage and seems to be unnecessarily rigid.  It is difficult to see a structure in the leave selection criteria.  In the words of the project manager it is ‘extremely tight’, which the FBU assumes to equate to inflexible.  At this point of design it doesn’t incorporate all the foreseeable absences so the rigidity will enhance as other factors are incorporated.  The union believe it should be simplified to be workable and acceptable.

33.The problems with leave selection in the current rota are made worse in the proposed rota.  For example, the current rota does not provide the ability to always have a level 3 or a level 4 officer available.  The proposed rota seems to make this worse.  The union can think of simple solutions that would guarantee one level 4 and two level 3 officers at all times (other than sickness and courses).  However, the constraints of the rota prevent these being explored by the service.

34.The union believes that a tight rota such as the one proposed may detract from the maintenance of competence due to increased likelihood of disrupted training and development activities.

35.With the proposed rota some officers are likely to see the people they manage less frequently. 

Officer Cover & Resilience

36.If the Chief Fire Officer aspires for a minimum of eleven officers on duty at any one time and can not achieve it, he should not be recommending an increase in the number of non-operational managers at the same time as losing operational managers.

37.The rota does not provide a minimum of eleven officers at all times that the IRMP report identified would occur. 

38.The proposed rota is deeply unpopular with the officers and the voluntary recall facility for resilience would need to be tested in relation to the new rota, if introduced.  Given what some members have communicated to the union this is a potential area of vulnerability in terms of resilience.

39.The average figures calculated by the project manager for the minimum number of officers on duty during the evenings and nights (10.64) are skewed by the effect of ‘doubling-up’ on Mondays.  If this is taken into account it reduces to 9.46.

40.Typically, the number of officers available for the sixty-six weekend hours will increase from the current planned nine to a future planned nine or ten.  For every other evening and night period (Monday 1700 hrs to Friday 0900 hrs), the numbers will decrease.

41.The planning criteria should be clear.  The union believed that they were when the IRMP plan was drafted but as the project has progressed it has become unclear.  For example, at the recent Principal Officer briefing of officers there were a variety of planning assumptions proposed by the Principal Officers from a minimum of seven to an aspiration of eleven.  The union believes the service should determine the number of officers it wants and then plan to employ the correct number of people to achieve this at all foreseeable times. 

42.The union believes that if the officers’ rota is to be changed then it would be an opportunity to correct some of the anomalies of the current rota.  However, it seems these anomalies are being compounded.  The constraints of the project are preventing these being appropriately explored.

43.The proposed rota does not guarantee a level 4 officer at all times.  The planning assumptions, as far as the union is aware, requires a level 4 officer.

44.The proposed rota does not guarantee two level 3 officers at all times.  Again the union believes this is required from the planning assumptions.

45.Currently the minimum planned number of officers is two in the West, two in the Central and three in the East. The proposed rota reduces this to one in the West, two in the Central and two in the East.

46.The union obviously accepts that operational cover is the priority.  However, the proposed rota is so tight that officers are less likely to be allowed to come off-the-run or be on last call whilst undertaking a training session.  The current practice being that this does happen.  This will impact on costs if the training is disrupted and needs to be rescheduled and also on the maintenance of competence for any affected officers with the consequent effect on safety management.  There are presumably some courses, such as driving and breathing apparatus courses, which would be very difficult to disrupt except in the most extreme circumstances.

47.When the project started the union was informed by ACFO Southern that it would determine what is needed in terms of operational cover and then plan how many officers needed to be employed to achieve this.  The day job would not come into it – the service would look at operational requirements before fitting operational posts to managerial roles.  This has not happened in this review.  The proposed rota identifies an under-provision of level 3 and 4 officers to ensure their availability against the planning assumptions.  It is proposed that the deficiencies would be made up by an over-provision of Principal Officers.  The union proposes that the review should identify the correct number of officers at each particular level.

48.Although the union is aware that the Principal Officers have said they will ‘act down’ to fill the gaps in the rota, the union believes it is entirely inappropriate for this to be a part of planned activity.  The Principal Officers do not undertake the same skills-based development activities as other officers and are also often out of the county.  

49.The union can not see resilience in relation to Fire Safety complaints and enforcement.

Intangibles

The union believes that the proposals, if implemented as they currently are, would be objectionable to 100% of the officer membership.  The union is concerned that the service has not fully considered the implications of this such as:

50.Reduction in loyalty to the organisation that would be manifested in not giving over and above contractual minima such as not staying on to get work done.  Indeed, individual officers are informing the union officials that goodwill will stop if this rota is implemented.

51.Reduced motivation leading to reduced excellence and innovation.

52.The proposals will involve a complete overhaul of what is expected of officers and the amount of work that they can undertake.

ENDS

FBU Response to RBFA IRMP Action Plan 2010-11 Consultation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Fire Brigades Union welcomes the opportunity to comment on the Royal Berkshire Fire Authority’s 2010/11 Action plan.

As an organization, the Fire Brigades Union has been at the vanguard of the move to risk based fire cover and remain convinced that this is the correct way to allocate limited resources. The Fire Brigades Union has a number of difficulties in fully signing up to the proposed current plan.

The overall plan fails to illustrate a clear route to improved public and Firefighter safety in Berkshire which has been one of the key principles behind the FBU’s position.

The union has previously demonstrated real concern at the momentum that the route to improved public and firefighter safety is being compromised through the drive to make budgetary savings and political statements. This concern has now been confirmed by the worsening in performance by RBFRS since the introduction of the IRMP process.

Despite representations to Senior Management expressing our concerns over direction the Brigade is taking with its ever changing ad-hoc priorities, these have been, by and large, ignored and dismissed.

The Brigade continues to make changes which are detrimental to the community we serve and the firefighters that we represent. These changes are made outside the IRMP process but have a significant impact on the Fire Authorities ability to deliver its strategic aims. The Action Plan does not acknowledge or take into account these detrimental changes.

Principles that have been agreed by all parties; the authority, the union and the management are not being implemented as consulted and/or agreed. There is no coherency in the IRMP’s application.

The union therefore urges the Fire Authority to reiterate its commitment to IRMP being the vehicle for improved public and Firefighter safety and then actively ensure that is what is being delivered.

The union ask the Fire Authority for evidence that the changes to the proposed PDA’s to RTC’s have been through the IRMP process and to demonstrate the positive impact of the changes on community safety, Firefighter safety and the continued provision of fire cover. We also ask you to evidence such changes in the Action Plan.

The union ask the Fire Authority for evidence that the continued proposed changes to the night cover at Windsor demonstrate a positive impact on community safety, Firefighter safety and the continued provision of fire cover. We also ask you to evidence such changes in the Action Plan.

The union sees no evidence in the Action Plan in the systematic planning to have the correct resources and structuring for other areas of activity such as, rescues, flooding and new dimension.

In spite of the fact that the IRMP process is supposed to provide local solutions to local problems, RBFRS will in the future be relying more heavily on external assistance.

We have seen direct and indirect manipulation of IRMP’s within other fire and Rescue services and we are now seeing projects being implemented outside this process which have a major impact on the overall outcomes of the IRMP plan. .  The FBU suggests that RBFA asks the service management to pull all projects that are under the IRMP umbrella into the IRMP process. The community of Royal Berkshire and its Firefighters expects honest and integrity from its fire and rescue management.

WHAT IS INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT PLANNING (IRMP)?

• IRMP is a process by which a fire and rescue service can devise appropriate responses to local requirements based on risk.
• The emphasis is to save life.
• Used properly it is possible to make our community safer.
• Used incorrectly it will cost lives!

 Integrated Risk Management means integrating prevention, protection and intervention strategies in order to reduce the risk to the public and firefighters.

• Prevention – stop fires before they start and as far as possible prevent other emergencies from occurring. Education is the key – for fire prevention a Home Fire Risk Assessment can be carried out to assist the public.
• Protection - in buildings covered by Fire Safety Legislation – stop fires before they start, give early warning of fire through automatic fire detection equipment, and limit fire spread through building design and building management so that people can get out safely if a fire does start. In residential premises including dwellings – give early warning of fires if they do start (e.g. smoke detectors), limit fire spread (sprinklers) coupled with Fire Escape Plans (what to do if a fire starts in your home to maximise your chances of escape/rescue).
• Intervention - have the correct level of emergency resources (firefighters/ emergency fire control operators / fire engines etc.) available to deal with fires and other emergencies when they do occur.

 Effective Community Risk Management requires robust balance of Prevention, Protection and Intervention strategies in order that the maximum number of lives can be saved, and injuries and property loss significantly reduced.

The truly integrated risk management plan will aim to improve standards in all areas of service activity not just attendance times to private dwellings and road traffic accidents. RBFRS is not delivering on its original commitments.

RBFRS DRIVERS FOR CHANGE

RBFRS clearly stated when presenting the 5 year IRMP plan that the main drivers for change were: ‘Fewer fire and special service deaths and injuries through the provision of safe and effective delivery of services including emergency response, community safety, and legislative fire safety activities’.

RBFRS went on to state that in order to achieve the above drivers for change, RBFRS has to get the RIGHT RESOURCES, AT THE RIGHT TIME, IN THE RIGHT PLACE.

In order to achieve the above, RBFRS and RBFA took the decision that all its planning ethos would be based on “Doing more with the same amount of money’, yet we see an increase in appliances being crewed with 4 riders, an increase in attendance times, an increase in fire deaths and an increase in the deterioration of the service we provide the community we are here to serve and protect.

The Fire Brigades Union agreed (and continues to agree) with the principles and aims of RBFRS IRMP but not necessarily its outcomes. However, since the implementation of the 5 year IRMP plan (2007 – 12) the Fire Brigades Union has had real concerns on how the plan is being implemented or, more to the point, how its not being implemented.

The Action Plan being consulted on clearly demonstrates that the Brigade has lost its focus on the original plan and many of the concerns expressed and presented to the Fire Authority in July 2007 have come to fruition.

The current IRMP is not delivering the original objectives of getting the right resources, at the right time, in the right place. Furthermore, should the Authority introduced the revised PDA’s to RTC’s, these objectives will be further eroded.

THE INTERVENTION WINDOW

Throughout the discussion of IRMP there is one central factor – the intervention window – and how it impacts on the chances of survival.

It is vital to understand this concept (illustrated below)

THE CORRECT APPROACH

It is important to avoid falling into the trap of viewing Integrated Risk Management Plans as no more than resource management strategies, with resources being switched from one area of activity to another, or resources being cut to save money.

Before any changes are implemented in the area of intervention as a result of proposals to alter activity in the areas of prevention and/or protection, the outcomes of such additional activity must clearly demonstrate proven and sustainable long-term improvements in both Firefighter safety and the safety of the communities that we serve.

To date, RBFRS has failed to demonstrate those improvements and analyses of its own performance indicators demonstrate that performance has deteriorated.

Home Fire Risk Checks have been the main vehicle to drive down the risk in the home but RBFRS cannot quantify if this drive has been successful or has had an impact on risk reduction. It should be noted that these HFRC’s are not delivered as communicated in the original IRMP, i.e. priority to be given to the outlying areas where RBFRS is not able to meet its attendance times.

The holistic approach to reducing fire deaths includes prevention measures such as education, identifying high risks and formulating a strategy to target these. Combined with protection measures which can assist in increasing the use of smoke detectors, sprinklers and emergency escape plans.

These however can only be effective when combined with properly resourced fire controls and fully crewed fire appliances that are available to react quickly and effectively.

FBU CONSIDERED RESPONSE TO THE ACTION PLAN 2010/11

Page 1           Executive Summary

Para 2 – Work will continue to reduce risk in local communities, the emphasis being on higher risk incidents  where people are more likely to be killed or injured. The risk analysis shows this to be dwelling fires and road traffic collisions.

FBU – The current proposals on the change to how RBFRS (which is not  evidenced in the IRMP plan nor the Action Plan) responds to Road Traffic Collisions will increase the risk of injury, death and losses to property and the economy.

Para 5 – Over the next five years a comprehensive review will be undertaken to confirm emergency resources are located in the optimum location to assist the community when required.

FBU – This being the case why does RBFRS continue with its proposal to close Windsor fire station at night time? It would be prudent to await the outcome of such comprehensive review

Page 1          Chairman’s Foreword

Para 2 – The proposals contained within this five year plan will continue the initiatives to improve the service to everyone living, working and travelling in Berkshire. The proposals should be seen as a complete package of measures to improve the level of service across the whole of the Brigade area.

FBU – The FBU concurs with the Chairman however we have evidence that the proposed changes outside the IRMP process which the community have not been consulted on will have a detrimental effect on the Chaiman’s vision.

Page 2           Integrated Risk Management Planning and How It Is Applied  Across Berkshire

Para 2 – he Brigade has 19 fire stations located across the Berkshire area. The  fire stations are staffed either by full time or part time staff. The part time stations are not permanently crewed, with staff responding to incidents from their places of work or their homes.

FBU – It should be indicated that Wokingham is only crewed during the day hours and no longer has Retained cover at night. Additionally, the fact that Cookham has now for all intent and purposes closed should also be communicated

Para 5 – The Brigade prefers the prevention strategy as opposed to response as  this effectively means there is no loss of life or injuries and no damage to property.

FBU – The FBU supports the spirit of this statement however we do not support the implication that prevention means that no loss of life, injuries or damage to property will occur. Response is a crucial and vital part in ensuring compliance with the spirit of the statement.

Page 6           (continued)

Para 3 - Each Fire and Rescue Authority must produce a publicly available Plan  covering at least a three-year time-span which: 

• Is regularly reviewed and revised and reflects up to date risk information and evaluation of service delivery outcomes;
• Has regard to the risk analyses completed by Local and Regional Resilience Forums including those reported in external Community Risk Registers and internal risk registers, to ensure that civil and terrorist contingencies are captured in their Plan;
• Reflects effective consultation during its development and at all review stages with representatives of all sections of the community and stakeholders;
• Demonstrates how prevention, protection and response activities will be best used to mitigate the impact of risk on communities in a cost effective way;
• Provides details of how Fire and Rescue Authorities deliver their objectives and meet the needs of communities through working with partners;
• Has undergone an effective equality impact assessment process.

FBU – The current Action Plan only captures the overall intention of the IRMP working group, not the intentions of Service Delivery whose proposals, should they be implemented, are detrimental to the overall 5 year plan, Action Plan, community and Firefighter safety and to the Fire Authorities Strategic Commitments.  The FBU suggests that RBFA asks the service management to pull all projects that are under the IRMP umbrella into the IRMP process to avoid the current situation where some projects are being implemented outside of the IRMP process.

Page 6           Value for Money

Para 1 – To provide the services in Berkshire for 2009/10 is approximately £33.5 Million. The funding is a combination of a Central Government grant of approximately (£18.1m) and Council Tax approximately (£15.4m). The Fire Service in Berkshire is the second lowest in the country with regard to Council Tax contributions (as a combined Fire Authority) with a Band D equivalent of £55.11.

FBU – Given that Berkshire is the second most cost effective Combined Fire Authority in the Country, it demonstrates that high quality of service can be achieved in a cost effective way. The current Service Delivery proposals, not contained within the Action plan, but should given they are part of the public-facing operational risk management, will result in a worsening of service which in real terms will mean less value for taxpayer’s money.

Page 7 Strategic Commitments

Para 1 – The Fire Authority’s vision is “A Safer Berkshire”. To deliver this vision the following Strategic Commitments have been endorsed by its members:

1. Minimise loss of life, injury and damage from fire, road traffic collisions and other hazards.
2. Improve public and business safety and reduce risk, through targeted education and enforcement of fire safety legislation.
3. Demonstrate continuous improvement and efficiencies, ensuring consultation and partnership working.
4. Be an employer of choice, offering equality of opportunity and development to all.
5. Provide resilient emergency response through risk management and  planning.
6. Conduct activities in an environmentally sustainable way.

FBU – The current proposals will sadly and inevitably lead to this vision not being realised. Loss of life has increased and so has damage from fire. Despite the considerable efforts and investment, the Brigade continues to make little inroads in the reduction of dwelling fires and RTC’s. It is a fact of life that accidents will happen and the Brigade should ensure that it continues to invest and strive towards a no fire/RTC deaths goal but that the appropriate response resources in the appropriate locations are maintained and improved where necessary.

 Page 8           Integrated Risk Management Plan Project Update

Crowthorne – The Brigade has continued using Camberley fire appliances, based in Surrey, on a trial basis to respond to incidents within a small area of Berkshire. The number of incidents has been lower than expected, which will affect the assessment of benefits provided if this alternative emergency resource is used.

To ensure accurate data is captured, the Brigade’s driving school will be used for time trials in the area. Once the data is captured it will be used to validate computer modelling to ensure informed decisions can be made about this project.

FBU – We have been informed that Surrey Fire and Rescue Service as part of their IRMP process are looking to re-locate one Camberley appliance ‘inland’. This will have a detrimental effect on RBFRS trial and will also impact on Surrey maintaining their standards.  FBU suggests the proposed action plan is amended to reflect the current situation.

Cookham – The specialist off road vehicles were re-Iocated to Cookham fire station and the crews have been trained in their use. The project has therefore been completed. In addition, the crews from Cookham, along with crews from Maidenhead, have been trained how to use the state of the art Incident Command Unit. Recently there have been difficulties recruiting staff at Cookham fire station. As a result the fire station has been temporarily closed and staff and vehicles have been relocated and combined with crews from Maidenhead fire station, to ensure emergency response is maintained for both areas.

FBU – The FBU, in its submission to the Fire Authority meeting in July 2007 identified problems with the original proposal and these concerns have now come to fruition. Cookham has ‘closed down’, we have lost a major front line appliance, the Control Unit has failed to crew with the appropriate Retained personnel on various occasions and Maidenhead’s Wholetime crew have had to crew the vehicle resulting in yet another major appliance being lost for fire cover. Further to this, the brigade’s Major Incident Resilience work carried out as part of the RDS Review highlighted the difficulties posed in the crewing of the ICU for both the RDS and WT. This occurred in both the 10 pump scenario and the 2×6 pump table top exercise.

There have also been difficulties in crewing the ‘Specialist Off Road Vehicles’ resulting in them not being immediately available when required. Wholetime personnel are now being trained in their use and Wargrave RDS personnel are also being used to crew these vehicles.

The action plan does not identify these problems and difficulties and therefore there is no proposed plan to address them.  The FBU suggests the plan is therefore amended in this area.

Environmental and Chemical Incident Response

The review was completed, and concluded that a replacement specialist Chemical Incident Unit was not required in 2009, saving in the region of £200,000. Alternatively a trial will be undertaken using the existing Operational Support Units (multi functional curtain sided vehicles), with amended stowage to accommodate the specialist equipment.

FBU – The £200,000 is a very high sum for a replacement vehicle. The FBU understands that a suitable replacement vehicle could have been purchased for some £80,000 and the trial has resulted in a compromise in the operational support capability of RBFRS.

Page 9

Regional Fire Control Centre and FireLink – The projects are part of the Central Government Resilience Agenda. The Regional Control project is behind schedule and there are still a number of areas that require clarity around cost and functionality. Based upon current timelines the project is due to conclude in 2012. Officers will continue to address the risks as the project evolves.

FireLink is the communication system, which has successfully replaced our previous radio system, this will enable the control centres to communicate with emergency vehicles. The second of three phases is now completed. The risk surrounding this area has been reduced as a result of this recent phase.

FBU – The FBU has campaigned against the introduction of such control centres and to date, the FBU have been proved right in every aspect and at every step of the process. There is no confidence in the project and there is a high likelihood that the centres will not be ready in 2012, some considerable years behind schedule. We also have serious concerns over the likely cost to RBFRS and the likely consequences on the level and quality of service we will be able to provide the community.

The FBU calls on the Fire Authority to publicly condemn this ill thought out project.

Windsor – In February 2009 a Judicial Review found in favour of the Fire  Authority’s consultation process to remove the night shift at Windsor fire station and provide cover from surrounding fire stations. Work is currently underway to implement the proposals

FBU – page 1, paragraph 5 of the Action Plan states “Over the next five years a comprehensive review will be undertaken to confirm emergency resources are located in the optimum location to assist the community when required.” The FBU therefore proposes that the implementation of the removal of the night cover is suspended until such a time as the review is carried out.

The FBU originally informed RBFRS that it could understand why there were proposals to relocate the Windsor appliance to Wokingham.  At the same time the FBU linked the viability of this move of resources to the overall availability of appliances in the east of Berkshire.  What we currently see is real problems with the overall availability of resources in the east of Berkshire with Ascot, Cookham and Maidenhead retained but with the plans for Windsor to be implemented irrespective of these. 

RBFRS is currently undertaking a “Retained Duty System Staff Review 2010” the outcomes of which will not be known until late 2010. It is an already established fact that RDS availability in Ascot and Maidenhead is sporadic and unreliable due to staff shortages. RBFRS is failing its attendance times in areas covered by Ascot and the closure of Windsor at night time will result in further deterioration in the level of service provided to those communities.

Service Delivery proposals to change the PDA’s to RTC’s will require a shift appliance to attend every RTC. This will result in Slough’s fire appliances being unavailable more often to provide fire cover in Windsor, which was the main argument put forward by RBFRS in supporting the closure of Windsor at night time. Furthermore, should these proposals go ahead, it will place extra pressure on Bracknell to cover Ascot area and this will have a detrimental effect across the board.

This is on top of the loss of Sonning and Cookham appliances and the difficulties experienced in mobilising Ascot and Maidenhead. In effect, should this proposal go ahead, it will mean that RBFRS has lost two appliances from the East of the County and fire cover can not be maintained to the expected high standards the community is accustomed to.

The FBU also wishes to record that the “Updated Timeline on Projects” on pages 20 and 21 of the Action Plan state that the Twyford/Wargrave, Caversham/Dee Road are suspended “Awaiting the outcome of the Retained Duty System Staff Review Project”. The FBU has previously requested that management afford the same status to the Windsor project but this has blankly been refused. A political statement being made to the detriment of the community in East Berkshire.

One of the reasons for the night closure of Windsor was to allocate the resources to the higher risk area in Wokingham. The Fire Authority has already demonstrated leadership by upgrading Wokingham without the need to downgrade Windsor in order to achieve full day cover. The FBU believes that the Fire Authority needs to demonstrate that leadership again by working closely with the FBU in order to come to a sustainable and cost effective solution.

Whilst persons continue to die in, be injured in, be rescued from fire, road traffic collisions and other incidents, it is simply immoral and unjustifiable to reduce the level of fire cover.

Whilst property and valuable assets continue to be at risk, destroyed and rescued from fire, major floodings and other incidents it is simply immoral and unjustifiable to reduce the level of resources.

Given that the stated aim of the RBFA is to make our community safer by doing more with the same, the FBU would urge the Fire Authority to review their decision to downgrade Windsor pending the outcome of the Retained project.

Wokingham - Following the decision by the Fire Authority to increase the crewing at the station, it is now crewed seven days a week. However it is still not crewed at night due to the limited facilities at the station. To accommodate the crews at night it is necessary to build a new fire station on the existing site. Work is under way to submit plans and obtain permission to build the facility.

FBU – We welcome the ongoing investment in the upgrading of the station however, we do not believe that the new build will be finished by the end of 2010. The FBU has also become aware that management are looking at the feasibility of closing Windsor and moving the personnel to the Wokingham area prior to the new build. This is not reflected in the Action Plan nor is it in the spirit of the agreed 5 year IRMP.  If that is the current plan it should be put into the document.

Twyford/Wargrave – due to the current difficulties recruiting Retained Duty System personnel (see retained viability section below), it is recommended that the proposal to build a new fire station at Twyford is postponed until such time as a way forward is established for the provision of emergency incident response across the Brigade area.

FBU – Given this statement it is clear to the FBU that RBFRS has no intention in building this station. These “difficulties” have not changed since the original 5 year IRMP plan, so why should they have such an impact now? There is no evidence of serious efforts being made to secure a site which could be purchased at a competitive price in the current climate.

Caversham Road = The 5 Year Plan proposed to relocate the crews from Dee Road fire station to Caversham Road fire station. Network Rail are undertaking significant expansion works of the train station and track in the vicinity of the fire station. The works include a temporary occupation of the fire station by Network Rail affecting the operational deployment of crews until the end of 2010…………

FBU – It is the FBU’s understanding that Network Rail are occupying the station and that the disruption will only cover 2 days on two separate occasions. We welcome the approach being made by management thus ensuring that the wider community is better protected. As previously communicated, the FBU continue to have concerns about this proposal as it will result in a vast number of people having to wait for an appliance should they have an emergency. Furthermore, there are serious shortages of Retained firefighters at Mortimer and Pangbourne which is currently backed up/covered by Dee Road.

Page 11         Long Term Strategies to Reduce Risk

Para 1 – Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service assesses risk to the community and risk to firefighters. The assessment of risk to the community has consistently identified two main areas that will cause death or injury to the public, these are road traffic collisions and fires in the home.

FBU – On the 2 April 2003 the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) issued Fire Service Circular 7/2003.  The circular informed all fire & rescue authorities in England, Wales & Northern Ireland that Integrated Risk Management Planning was a key element in the Government’s programme of reform and modernisation for the Fire & Rescue service.  As such each authority would be required to produce an Integrated Risk Management Plan for their brigade area.

One of the government’s key objectives was a reduction in the commercial, economic and social impact of fires and other emergency incidents.  The government subsequently produced a spreadsheet which allowed fire authorities to determine the consequential cost of fires to society and the economy.

The Services IRMP working party introduced baseline performance figures for dwelling fires and road traffic collisions based on 2002/3 data.  It was agreed that these would be used as a benchmark to demonstrate year on year improvement.  The FBU agreed in principal to this approach and asked for it to become a standing agenda item.  Simply put, anything the Service did under IRMP would have a positive impact on performance based upon demonstrable evidence.

The Service’s current consultation Action Plan document clearly demonstrates that its performance has significantly decreased against these baseline figures of 2002/03.  This is an extremely worrying trend which does not appear to be addressed within the document.

Taking into account the figures taken from CLG’s cost of fire index it can be clearly demonstrated in the following tables that the authority is not achieving its target to reduce the economic cost of fire associated with dwelling fires.

Note; In the absence of specific data non fatal injury equates to the average of the following three values:-

• Non fatal injury involving burns   £174,354
• Non fatal injury (smoke)                   £44,019
• Non fatal injury other                        £574
• Average value                                       £218947 / 3 = £72,982

 The figures demonstrate that the cost of fire measured against dwelling fires has risen by £2,885,369 over the past three years which is clearly unacceptable.  The FBU does not feel that this issue is adequately being addressed within the fire authority’s consultation IRMP document and would like to see additional initiatives to reduce the economic impact of fire in line with government’s expectations.

Page 11         Road Traffic Collisions
                         Carwise
                         Motorwise
                         Safe Drive – Stay Alive
                         Hoax and Crash Impact

FBU – The FBU has and continuous to support RBFRS’s involvement and promotion of these initiatives but there is concern over the long term viability due to the source of the funding to carry out such functions.

Page 12         Response to Road Traffic Collisions

Table showing how Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service performs against the standard for Road Traffic Collisions

The Brigade’s performance in this area has slightly decreased. Every failure to achieve the performance standard is investigated by managers and action is taken to improve standards where necessary.

FBU – Despite the emphasis of IRMP being to reduce this risk, the FBU is concerned over the drop in performance and is alarmed at the failure of the Action Plan to address this issue. Furthermore, the current intention of Service Delivery to remove the RSV’s from the PDA’s without due IRMP process being followed will only result in a worse service being provided to the community. The FBU wish to see an attendance standard being set for RSV’s not just the first appliance.

Page 13         Fires In The Home

Although less people die in their homes as a result of fire than on the roads in Berkshire, it is still one of the highest risks to the community that needs to be managed by the Brigade. To reduce the risk of death and injury from fire the Brigade is undertaking targeted Home Fire Safety Checks. The check involves a visit to the home by brigade personnel, an assessment of risks arising from fire and the installation, if required, of a free smoke detector(s). To target the areas of highest need the Brigade utilises a range of data and information.

FBU – Home Fire Risk Checks have been the main vehicle to drive down the risk in the home and we welcome the continued commitment to this initiative. However, we have concerns over the long term viability of this project due to funding and also the fact that there are no contingencies in place to replace the detectors when they expire at the end of their 10 year life span.

Response to Dwelling Fires

…………..

• The higher risk localities where it is predicted that appliances will not reach dwelling fires within the standard response will be prioritised for community safety initiatives to drive down the risk.

 FBU – As already indicated, the FBU has seen no evidence that this is the case and would like the Action Plan demonstrate where this has been achieved, what percentage of HFRC’s have been carried out in these areas and what plans does RBFRS have in order to drive down the risk in the future.

Page 14

Table showing how Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service performs against the optimum response for Dwelling Fires

 

Table showing how Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service performs against the standard response for Dwelling Fires

The Brigade’s performance in this area has slightly decreased compared with the baseline year 2002/03. Every failure to achieve the performance standard is investigated by managers and action is taken to improve standards where necessary. The number of calls to dwelling fires has reduced over time, with a number now occurring in more remote locations from full time fire stations, which has an affect on performance.

FBU – Anything the Service does under IRMP must have a positive impact on performance based upon demonstrable evidence. The tables above clearly demonstrate that there are problems in this area which need to be investigated. It should also be noted that the figures produced above are based on a Brigade average and not that of individual appliance performance. The pursuit of downgrading Windsor will have a further detrimental effect on RBFRS’s performance.

Page 16         Sprinklers

Para 2 – Increasingly, ‘domestic’ type sprinklers are becoming available to protect the vulnerable in their homes. Whilst sprinklers are only mandatory in a small range of buildings, high rise flats, large uncompartmented buildings etc. the Brigade is keen to promote the use of sprinklers and is happy to provide advice to those considering their use.

FBU – We would like to see a commitment by the Fire Authority to lead by example and consider fitting sprinkler systems to its own premises. Furthermore, it is clear to the FBU that this initiative will only be successful if it becomes part of building regulations in relation to private dwellings. We urge the Authority to canvas government to introduce the appropriate legislation.

Page 23         Young Firefighter Programme
                           Angling Initiative
                           Evolution Programme

FBU – The FBU has and continuous to support RBFRS’s involvement and promotion of these initiatives but is concerned over the long term viability due to the source of the funding to carry out such functions.

Page 28         Retained Duty System Staff Review 2010

FBU – We welcome this well overdue project albeit we have reservations over its potential outcome. It is disappointing that despite RBFRS undertaking a comprehensive IRMP RDS project in its first IRMP, the outcomes of that project were never followed up. The FBU wishes to see a commitment to the long term viability of the RDS service in RBFRS

Page 29         Training Resources Review 2010

FBU – We welcome this review into our training facilities which at times are not fit for purpose due to the amount of courses being run and the fact that facilities have to be shared with a fire station and a commercial operation. We also wish to see a review of the human resources required to carry the necessary training in order to maximise knowledge and skills thus assisting in ensuring Firefighter safety and that of the community it serves.

Page 30        Heritage Buildings 2010

Due to a number of heritage buildings and structures in the Brigade area a review will be undertaken on how risk is managed for such premises. The review will consider how heritage is incorporated within the Brigade’s risk management systems, develop response and prevention strategies to reduce the risk and loss from fire. Some historic buildings, monuments and landscapes are of national or sometimes international importance contributing to the local economy through associated business enterprise and tourism. Any strategy to reduce loss will therefore have wider impacts than just the heritage site itself.

FBU – The Action Plan does not give an indication of the Brigades thoughts on a strategy and the Brigades admission that “Some historic buildings, monuments and landscapes are of national or sometimes international importance contributing to the local economy through associated business enterprise and tourism.” further demonstrates a rethink of its position with regards to Windsor fire station. It should be remembered that most serious fires and loss in property and life occur at night time, the same time period the Brigade wishes to withdraw cover.

ROYAL BERKSHIRE FIRE AUTHORITY

This response has been sent to all Members of the Royal Berkshire Fire Authority who have a duty to consult with all stakeholders on their Integrated Risk Management Plan.

ROYAL BERKSHIRE FIRE BRIGADES UNION

The FBU represents the vast majority of the uniformed staff in Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service. Our members are frontline public service workers – covering all roles of Firefighter including emergency fire control Firefighters.

The Union is divided into Branches which meet regularly at Brigade Committee. The day to day running of the Union in Berkshire is mandated to the Elected Officials.

Berkshire Fire Brigades Union -

Download Document in PDF Format