FBU Response to RBFA IRMP Action Plan 2011-12 Consultation

Introduction

The Fire Brigades Union thanks Royal Berkshire Fire Authority for the opportunity to comment on the draft IRMP Action Plan for 2011-12.  The Fire Brigades Union comments are intended to be constructive. 

The financial situation for Royal Berkshire Fire Authority at the close of the IRMP consultation period is healthier than at the commencement.  The union believes that the Authority should now instruct the Chief Fire Officer to utilize the period of increased financial certainty to research the proposals more thoroughly and not implement front-line related changes too hastily.  The rush to save in risk critical areas exposes Royal Berkshire Fire Authority to risk that could be avoided.

The following comments relate to the particular sections of the IRMP Action Plan (Consultation Document).

Executive Summary

The Fire Brigades Union general observations on the 2011-12 IRMP Action Plan for Royal Berkshire Fire Authority are:

• Overall, fire engine attendance times to dwelling fires and road traffic collisions in Newbury, Reading, Bracknell, Maidenhead, Windsor and Slough will worsen.
• Fire engines will be delayed attending real fires in commercial premises.
• Wholetime fire engines will be crewing with four firefighters more often and subsequently will be able to achieve less at dynamic emergency incidents.
• The resilience for command and control of larger and protracted incidents will not be improved.
• The IRMP is not a properly integrated plan.  Although there are plans to reduce and diminish service there is no justification as to why cuts in some areas are more acceptable than growth in other areas of the Authority’s budgetary plans. 
• The approach to IRMP and to managing the budgetary pressures does not adequately reflect national guidance leaving the Authority exposed to criticism and may also be at the expense of the wellbeing of the general public as well as the firefighters.
• The plan has not adapted to the changing financing situation.  It doesn’t seem right to the union that the removal of front-line resources are being planned whilst at the same time the Authority is planning to bank nearly one million pounds over two years to fund new buildings.  It also doesn’t seem right that new non front-line posts are being introduced in the budgetary process whilst existing front-line posts are being removed in the IRMP process.

Recommendations

1. If the Chairman’s comments in the foreword are to mean something then some of the proposed actions must be amended to ensure the front-line service is maintained.
2. There should be a place in the IRMP documents to detail how performance is progressing against the baseline figures. 
3. The Authority should be reporting each year in the IRMP documents whether the changes being made in IRMP are improving performance.
4. The Authority should ensure that there is consistency in reporting the statistics from year to year and where there are anomalies, these should be explained.
5. The report that the environmental protection and firefighter decontamination procedures are improved should be justified or removed.
6. The detailed review being undertaken to improve attendance times to dwelling fires should be an integral element of the IRMP Action Plan for 2011-12.
7. If the Authority proposes to send wholetime appliances to lower risk calls on retained station grounds then this should be on the basis that it doesn’t adversely affect the response standards for dwelling fires and road traffic collisions.
8. If the Authority proposes the benefits of reduced emergency response vehicle travel in one project but a consequence of another proposal is that it will increase, then criteria should be set so risk versus benefit can be assessed.
9. A reduction in the number of officers available for emergency response and urgent managerial duties should not happen without detailed evidence and research.
10. The Authority should not be proposing an IRMP project in relation to the number of officers on the false premise that it is required due to fewer incidents.
11. If a model for officer cover does exist but doesn’t increase resilience from 9 to 11 whilst at the same time reducing numbers employed from 45 to 33, then the plans should be reconsidered.
12. The Fire Authority should engage directly with the union to resolve issues in relation to the Officers’ Cover Review.
13. If the Fire Authority intends for crewing on wholetime appliances to be reduced to four firefighters on more occasions, it should set criteria so a risk versus benefit assessment can be made.
14. Royal Berkshire Fire Authority should adopt the nationally agreed CFOA protocol in relation to Automatic Fire Alarms and Unwanted Fire Signals.
15. The Authority should not embark on a project that from the outset it is known will lead to inherent delays in emergency response to fires in commercial premises.
16. Before progressing with the plans in relation to switch-crewing the Heavy Rescue vehicle the Authority should assess the financial benefits against the societal risks given there will be an adverse effect in relation to the dwelling fire and RTC response standards.
17. Given the proposed savings are identified for 2013-14, rather than fixing the proposed Heavy Rescue Unit crewing arrangements in 2011, the Authority should monitor and revisit the Heavy Rescue Unit proposals once the 2013-14 finance settlement is known.

Observations

Chairman’s Foreword.

The Chairman states that the Authority is determined ‘to maintain our front-line service’.  Yet in certain places in the Action Plan those front-line services are, to a degree, being eroded such as increased switch-crewing, delayed attendances to higher risk incidents and delayed attendances to fires at commercial premises.  If the Chairman’s comments in the foreword are to mean something then some of the proposed actions must be amended to ensure the front-line service is maintained.

Our Performance.

A lot of work was done in previous years in setting baseline figures for IRMP against the response standards.  The idea was that there would be a rolling baseline figure that advanced by one year each year.  The FBU is adamant that there should be a place in the IRMP documents to detail how performance is progressing against the baseline figures.  The Authority should be reporting each year in the IRMP documents whether the changes being made in IRMP are improving performance.   

Emergency Response. Page 8, Para 4.

Where is the evidence that the new system for the provision of environmental protection and firefighter decontamination is improved?  The deployment time is longer under the new system.  The report that the environmental protection and firefighter decontamination procedures are improved should be justified or removed.

Response to Road Traffic Collisions.

The figures on the graph on page 8 are at variance with the figures on the corresponding graph of the previous years IRMP.  Yet they are intending to show the same figures.  There is an error somewhere.  The Authority should ensure that there is consistency in reporting the statistics from year to year and where there are anomalies, these should be explained.

Response to Dwelling Fires. Page 9, bottom.

The plan identifies that there is a detailed review underway to improve performance in relation to the attendance times at dwelling fires.  The Fire Brigades Union is unaware of this review.  The detailed review being undertaken to improve attendance times to dwelling fires should be an integral element of the IRMP Action Plan for 2011-12.

What we are going to do this year

Wholetime appliances attending lower risk calls on retained station grounds.

The Fire Brigades Union has strong reservations about the Authority progressing with this project.  The areas of concern being:

• The only improvement here seems to be saving money.  The union is not averse to finding efficiencies, especially when those efficiencies are recycled into increased firefighter and public safety.  However, the people of Berkshire are likely to be more at risk given the negative effects on the response standards to the higher risk incidents.  Has the Authority fully considered that if a wholetime appliance is attending a low risk incident on a retained station ground then it is not available for a higher risk incident on its own station ground where the likelihood of an incident is greater? 
• There are mixed messages in relation to the overall IRMP proposals.  Some 2011-12 IRMP projects identify a benefit of change being reduced vehicle movements and the consequent reduced road safety and environmental risks.  It seems this project will deliver the opposite.
• Discrepancies between the potential savings identified in the IRMP Action Plan and the potential savings identified in the latest budget figures. 
• Although it is clear to the union that there will be some savings, and if nothing is done and Retained appliances become more available as a result of Retained Support Officers, the costs will go up; the union still believes in the principle that the service should plan against the higher risks namely dwelling fires and road traffic collisions.  If this policy is introduced attendance times to those higher risk incidents will be adversely affected to some extent.

If the Authority proposes to send wholetime appliances to lower risk calls on retained station grounds then this should be on the basis that it doesn’t adversely affect the response standards for dwelling fires and road traffic collisions.

If the Authority proposes the benefits of reduced emergency response vehicle travel in one project but a consequence of another proposal is that it will increase, then criteria should be set so risk versus benefit can be assessed.

Officers’ Cover Review. Page 18

The first paragraph clearly identifies a rationale for needing to review the number of officers as being linked to the reduction in the number of incidents being attended by Berkshire firefighters.  Given the evidence indicates that the number of larger 4+ appliance incidents in remaining steady, if not rising, over the previous eight years; the reduction in incidents in general is clearly not a reason to review the number and deployment of officers.  If it is about financing, as Principal Officers have told the union verbally, then just write that in the document as the primary driver for this project.  The Authority should not be proposing an IRMP project in relation to the number of officers on the false premise that it is required due to fewer incidents.

The Fire Brigades Union does not understand how reducing the number of officers will enhance resilience as the end of paragraph 1 states. 

The wording of the third paragraph should be amended.  It states:

Should budgetary pressures require it a model exists that would phase a reduction in officer numbers from 45 to 33, producing predicted savings of £350,000 in year one to £697,000 per annum in year three. In this model the minimum number of officers on duty at any one time will increase from 9 to 11 with the shift pattern altering from a five week to a three week frequency.

That statement clearly says there is a model in existence that will do three things, namely:

• Reduce officer numbers from 45 to 33,
• Make savings rising to £697K.
• Increase the minimum number of officers available at any one time from 9 to 11.

Does a model exist that can do these three things?  If a model for officer cover does exist but doesn’t increase resilience from 9 to 11 whilst at the same time reducing numbers employed from 45 to 33, then the plans should be reconsidered as that is what the Principal Officers told the Fire Authority could be delivered. 

The union and its members have been told various things about this model. Different senior managers have told different officers’ representatives different things about the existence of this model.

The union has now been informed informally on 27 Jan 2011 that the service will reduce to forty officers working a five week rota as an interim measure on 1 Apr 2011.  This will reduce minimum numbers from nine to eight and has been derived completely outside of IRMP and the Officers’ Cover Review.  A reduction in the number of officers available for emergency response and urgent managerial duties should not happen without detailed evidence and research.

The union is willing to work with the service to derive a new officers’ rota.  However, the union is experiencing an enormous loss of confidence in relationships with senior managers in recent months over this issue.  In short one thing is being said in meetings and something else and detrimental is happening subsequently. 

As a result, the union recommends that the Fire Authority should engage directly with the union to resolve issues in relation to the Officers’ Cover Review.

Closure of Cookham. Page 18

The plan says the appliances in Maidenhead would cover the Cookham area to the same level previously provided by the Cookham crew.  Where is the evidence for this?  As it identifies in the report on above (at the bottom of page 10) the cover would be to the same standard in the majority of areas but not in all areas.

Protection Review

The Protection review hadn’t been through challenge and subsequent consultation prior to the drafting of the 2011-12 IRMP Action Plan.   The union is concerned that with a three week rota, there will not be 100% availability of Fire Safety officers with the proposed Protection department structure. 

The Fire Brigades Union welcomes increased integration of protection into the everyday activities of firefighters.

Prevention Review

The Fire Brigades Union notes the restructure of the Prevention department.  The union queries the levels of the two station managers in the structure.  If their role is similar to the work undertaken by the two current group managers, the union queries whether it can be achieved appropriately within the station manager role map.  The Fire Brigades Union will work with the service to determine that.

The union believes that there is still more work to be done by the service to integrate better the prevention work done by operational staff on fire stations with the work done and being planned at service headquarters. 

Formation of a Retained Support Unit

There is concern that forming the Retained Support Unit from the training reserve will almost certainly increase the number of occasions that wholetime appliances crew with four riders as opposed to the Authority’s policy aim of crewing with five.  If the Fire Authority intends for crewing on wholetime appliances to be reduced to four firefighters on more occasions, it should set criteria so a risk versus benefit assessment can be made.

Attendance at Automatic Fire Alarm Incidents

The current proposals in the Action Plan will result in Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service not attending fires detected by fire alarms in commercial premises when first alerted.  If the CFOA protocol were to be followed this would not occur.

The Fire Brigades Union believes this will affect the health and safety of responding firefighters should there be a dynamic emergency incident when the crew arrives.   The Authority should not embark on a project that from the outset it is known will lead to inherent delays in emergency response to fires in commercial premises.

As the lead practitioner nationally in relation to this, Berkshire’s Chief Fire Officer has signed the CFOA protocol on the Fire and Rescue Service attendance to Automatic Fire Alarms and Unwanted Fire Signals, derived in partnership with the industry.  In that document he writes the following: “we strongly recommend that all FRSs adopt and implement this protocol in its entirety as a part of their Integrated Risk Management Plans.”  However, the proposals in this IRMP are at variance with this nationally derived protocol.  The union believes that for Berkshire not to adopt the protocol in its entirety would be an embarrassment.  More importantly, the protocol introduces greater risk control that what is currently being proposed in the IRMP Action Plan.  Royal Berkshire Fire Authority should adopt the nationally agreed CFOA protocol in relation to Automatic Fire Alarms and Unwanted Fire Signals.

Switch-Crewing the Heavy Rescue Unit

The proposals do not indicate the reduction in service should this happen but does identify the financial savings.  This is an IRMP document and if the authors have taken the time and effort to consider the savings they should balance this by showing the estimated sacrifice.  Moreover, the Fire Authority members should have been informed of this in the drafting stages.  Before progressing with the plans in relation to switch-crewing the Heavy Rescue vehicle the Authority should assess the financial benefits against the societal risks given there will be an adverse effect in relation to the dwelling fire and RTC response standards.

The Authority is aware that the Fire Brigades Union is opposed to switch-crewing front line fire engines with specialist appliances.  If one is out and about but the other is needed for an emergency, there is a delay.  Any delay in the response of an emergency appliance is unacceptable as people can die as a result, among them our own firefighters.  There will be no comfort in ‘I told you so’ should there be a death that could have been prevented.

The union is not aware of any evidence showing that the trial that commenced in May 2010 identified switch-crewing the fire engine with the Heavy Rescue Unit is viable.  As far as the union is aware it indicated that removal the Rescue Support Vehicles (and by inference the Heavy Rescue Vehicle) from smaller rescue incidents did not carry too much risk to the Authority; although the union does not concur with that conclusion.   The trial involving the existing vehicle was conducted with the existing vehicle being permanently crewed.  This proposal is for the crewing to be switched with a fire engine.  So what evidence does Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service have from the trial that the proposal is viable?  Also was there an effect on the performance against the dwelling fire response standards during this trial? 

Newbury is a location where there are already greater difficulties attaining the Authority’s response standards. The statistics show this.  Between 1 Sep. and 16 Dec. 2010 optimum dwelling fire response standards were met on sixteen percent of occasions in the Newbury area.  It will get worse again should there be a frequency increase in switch-crewing fire engines with special appliances.  The opposite is a risk too; should the fire engine be out and about there will be inherent delay in getting specialist equipment to many technical rescue incidents.  The union is aware that managers are already talking about moving the Heavy Rescue Unit to Reading and switch-crewing it there with a fire engine as opposed to Newbury.  Is this is what is meant by the word ‘currently’ in the section heading?  If so the Authority should be unambiguous about its intentions in the IRMP document.

The union notes that the proposed savings for this project are in 2013 -14 and believes that given the proposed savings are identified for 2013-14, rather than fixing the proposed Heavy Rescue Unit crewing arrangements in 2011, the Authority should monitor and revisit the Heavy Rescue Unit proposals once the 2013-14 finance settlement is known.  Should retained availability in the West of the county improve as a result of the IRMP then the risk in relation to this proposed project reduces.  The Fire Brigades Union reiterates, however, that it does not support switch-crewing as a model for providing emergency response.

Fire Brigades Union – Berkshire (31 January 2011)

Download the submission in PDF format

ENDS